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MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO 
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED 
DISCLOSURE, by Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Carl E. Schneider1
DANIELLE Y. CORNACCIA
“TELLING PEOPLE MORE THAN THEY WANT TO KNOW in language they don’t 
understand should not have legal consequences.”2 That proposition tells you 
almost everything you need to know about More Than You Wanted to Know: The 
Failure of Mandated Disclosure. In this entertaining book, Omri Ben-Shahar and 
Carl E. Schneider critique the purpose and performance of mandated disclo-
sure—a regulatory tool designed to help lay people make informed decisions 
regarding various transactions while relieving disclosers of some legal liability. 
An expectation that people “read the fine print”3 is largely an outgrowth 
of the common law of contracts and torts. But the fine print can create a safe 
harbour for otherwise careless disclosers. The authors define “disclosure” broadly. 
Species of this regulatory tool include, for example, forms for informed consent 
to health care, securities prospectuses, store return policies, copyright warnings, 
food labels, mortgage documents, and even “disclosures reminding people that 
comprehensive disclosures are available in writing.”4 
1.  (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014) 229 pages.
2.  Ibid at 195.
3.  Ibid at 170.
4.  Ibid at 28.
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Mandated disclosure is pilloried throughout the book’s three parts and 
twelve chapters. Part one sketches the ubiquity of mandated disclosure, part 
two tells the reader why disclosure fails, and part three asks whether mandated 
disclosure can be saved. The short answer to the latter question is no; the authors 
think mandated disclosure is mostly hopeless. And the focus of their work is to 
explain why disclosure is hopeless rather than to offer a regulatory panacea in 
disclosure’s place. 
So why, then, is disclosure ubiquitous? This regulatory tool “resonates 
with two fundamental American ideologies,”5 the free-market principle and 
the autonomy principle. In the first case, “Markets work best when buyers are 
informed; disclosures inform them.”6 In the second case, “People are entitled 
as a matter of moral right and of practical policy to make the decisions that 
shape their lives.”7
Why does disclosure fail? The authors respond with a review of empirical 
research suggesting that “mandated disclosure rests on false assumptions about 
how people live, think, and act … [and] about how well information improves 
decisions.”8 The research is based mainly in behavioural economics, and the 
examples discussed are exclusively American. Studies suggest that people 
tend to be averse to decision making, to lack the competencies necessary to 
understand disclosures, to be paralyzed by the amount of information provided 
by disclosures, and to make irrational inferences no matter the amount or quality 
of information provided. For example, one study found only 15 per cent of 
shareholders reported reading the whole prospectus required under securities 
law.9 Behavioral economists have also noticed that “things vivid and disturbing 
are more readily remembered than things drab and routine.”10 This so-called 
availability bias has incited “some people [to] pay more for insurance against 
terrorism than for insurance against a slate of risks that includes terrorism.”11 For 
these and other reasons, “[d]eciding not to be informed and not to use disclosures 
is often patently rational.”12 
5.  Ibid at 5.
6.  Ibid.
7.  Ibid.
8.  Ibid at 12.
9.  Ibid at 68.
10.  Ibid at 110.
11.  Ibid.
12.  Ibid at 56-57 [emphasis in the original].
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One might infer that mandated disclosure is harmless, albeit useless. But 
the authors argue that it is “not harmless if its costs outweigh its benefits.”13 A 
key mischief of mandates is that they “obscure the difference between revealers 
(good guys who volunteer information) from concealers (bad guys who must be 
forced).”14 The fact that there is no clear substitute for disclosure is not a reason 
to continue mandating disclosure. The authors thus urge lawmakers “not to use 
a failed regulatory method.”15 What people really need, according to the authors, 
is advice from suitably experienced individuals (e.g., lawyers, product reviewers) 
rather than disclosure. 
In sum, Ben-Shahar and Schneider paint a grim picture of disclosure as 
resembling el Requerimiento—a Spanish-language text that was read by colonial 
Spaniards to non-Spanish-speaking Indigenous people in the New World asking 
them to “acknowledge the Church as the ruler and superior of the whole world,” 
lest they wish to face war.16 If the cited passages suggest nothing else, it is that the 
authors have written an engaging, down-to-earth and accessible book, which adds 
to a vibrant literature exploring the limits of both paternalistic and libertarian 
approaches to regulatory decision-making.17 
13.  Ibid at 169.
14.  Ibid at 173.
15.  Ibid at 184.
16.  Ibid at 195.
17.  See e.g. Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate: The Fine Print, Vanishing Rights, and 
the Rule of Law (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2013); Cass R Sunstein, 
“Empirically Informed Regulation” (2011) 78:4 U Chicago L Rev 1349; Lauren E Willis, 
“Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem of Predatory Lending: Price” 
(2006) 65:3 Md L Rev 707.
